Fiscal Implications of Aids in South Africa by Johansson, Lars
Fiscal implications of AIDS in South Africa
Lars M. Johansson¤




The number of people living with HIV is alarmingly large. In addition to the
incomprehensible human suﬀering of those directly aﬀected, AIDS also has
large, negative economic eﬀects. In this paper, I study the ﬁscal implications
of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa in a standard neo-classical growth
model. I ﬁnd that an antiretroviral program is to a large extent self ﬁnancing.
Improvement in dependency ratios and health care cost savings would pay
for Rand 144 billion of a full epidemiological intervention. The indirect eﬀect
through the changing demographic structure will be more important than the
direct health care cost saving eﬀect. I also explore diﬀerent taxation policies.
The households would be willing to sacriﬁce an amount equal to 12% of GDP
in the ﬁrst period to be subject to an optimal (Ramsey) ﬁscal policy rather
than an alternative ﬁxed debt to GDP policy. The optimal policy implies an
increase in government debt during the peak of the epidemic.
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11 Introduction
The number of people living with HIV is alarmingly large. The global estimate for
the end of 2005 was 38.6 million. Two thirds of those infected with HIV live in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Several countries in this region have adult infection rates exceeding
20%. In South Africa, about 5 million people currently live with the infection, which
is the highest absolute number of HIV+ people in any country, although not the
highest prevalence rate (UNAIDS, 2006).1
AIDS related deaths are dramatically changing the demographic structure of
these African countries. In addition to the incomprehensible human suﬀering of
those directly aﬀected, AIDS also has large, negative economic eﬀects on these
countries; many of which are already struggling with problems of severe poverty.
This paper explores the economic eﬀects of AIDS in South Africa from 2000
to 2030. This is done in a standard neo-classical growth model where I focus on
the ﬁscal eﬀects of AIDS. The two main questions addressed in this paper are: Can
policy interventions designed to treat AIDS patients and ﬁght the spread of AIDS in
South Africa be (at least partially) self-ﬁnancing? What is the optimal government
policy of taxes and transfers during a prolonged struggle against AIDS?
South Africa has experienced a long-run demographic transition with falling
dependency ratios, due to the fact that most families now have fewer children.
However, over the next few years, the dependency ratio will not fall as quickly as it
would have in the absence of AIDS. 2
Figure 1 displays the expected number of new HIV+ per age group in South
Africa in 2005. The number of new HIV cases peaks at ages 20-25, albeit somewhat
1The infection rate among the adult population in SA is estimated to be 18.8% (UNAIDS,
2006).
2In this paper, the dependency ratio is deﬁned as young, old and AIDS-sick in relation to the
non-AIDS-sick working age population (i.e. 16-65 years of age). Source: based on forecast from
the Actuarial Society of South Africa’s demographic model. Evidence from other countries points
in the same direction. In Botswana, it is estimated that every income earner in the households
belonging to the lowest income quartile can expect an additional four dependents as an eﬀect of
AIDS (BIDPA, 2000)
2earlier for women and somewhat later for men.3 Some ﬁve to ten years after people
have become infected, they will fall ill with AIDS and die, after a shorter or longer
time of illness, unless they receive treatment with antiretroviral drugs. Currently,
many poor South Africans do not have access to these drugs. AIDS related deaths
are expected to peak at ages 30-40.
Figure 1: New HIV infections per age group




















Notes: Based on predictions from the Actuarial Society of South Africa’s (ASSA) demographic
model for the year 2005.
This means that the HIV+ tend to die at the age when they would otherwise be
important contributors to the livelihood of their families. Moreover, in terms of the
joint public budget, this group is the major contributor. The net beneﬁciaries of
3There are also a number of newborns that get the virus through mother to child transmission.
Otherwise, there are basically no new HIV infections among young people until they become
sexually active.
3Figure 2: Fiscal proﬁle and AIDS deaths













































Notes: The AIDS death proﬁle is based on predictions from the ASSA’s demographic model for
the year 2005. The ﬁscal proﬁle is a compilation of the tax-, transfer- and public consumption-
proﬁles used in this paper. See section 3 and appendix B for more details.
government transfers and public goods (i.e. the relatively young and old) are groups
not directly hit by AIDS themselves (except for infants that get HIV through mother
to child transmission) but their need for support from the government will increase
as an eﬀect of the epidemic.
The top graph in ﬁgure 2 plots an estimate of the age proﬁle of net ﬁscal con-
tributions. The bottom graph in ﬁgure 2 shows the age proﬁle of AIDS deaths.
Mortality rates are at their highest when people would otherwise start to become
ﬁscal net contributors. Clearly, the AIDS epidemic will put a signiﬁcant strain on
the ﬁscal balance as an increasing number of people become infected. This eﬀect,
however, will be somewhat reduced by the lower infection rate among the rich and
the fact that wealthy people will most likely have access to antiretroviral drugs.
4The continued development of the epidemic to a large extent depends on gov-
ernment policies. In South Africa, information campaigns reach a large part of the
population, while antiretroviral drugs (ARV) only reach a smaller share of those in
need. There has been a debate on whether South Africa can aﬀord to implement
an ARV-program on a broad scale (Nattrass, 2004). The government response to
the need for an ARV-program has been delayed, with reference to the high costs.
So, even if it is believed that the motivation for AIDS-intervention should be based
on humanitarian reasoning, it must still be a good idea to look at the ﬁscal bene-
ﬁts of AIDS intervention programs. Can these beneﬁts oﬀset the direct costs of an
intervention?
In this paper, I study the ﬁscal eﬀects of AIDS and search for an optimal taxa-
tion policy in a standard neo-classical growth model, similar to that used in Flod´ en
(2003). I use demographic forecasts by South African demographic experts. These
forecasts are based on diﬀerent assumptions with regard to the level of epidemio-
logical intervention chosen by the South African government. I ﬁrst analyze how
diﬀerent epidemiological interventions aﬀecting the demographic structure will in-
ﬂuence the ﬂows of taxes, transfers and government consumption. Together, these
ﬂows can be used to quantify the ﬁscal impact of the interventions. Then, I calculate
how taxes and debt should be allocated over the epidemic cycle if the government
wants to maximize household welfare. I also estimate the size of the welfare eﬀect of
choosing a suboptimal policy. A ﬁxed debt policy represents the suboptimal policy
(i.e. a policy resembling the current conservative ﬁscal policy by the South African
government).
The assumption made about the household’s credit constraint is critical for the
result. In many macro papers on AIDS, some exogenously ﬁxed savings rate is ap-
plied which is equivalent to setting a rather tight credit constraint. The baseline
in this model is also a tight credit constraint (but I also explore the implication of
loosening this constraint and allow for free intertemporal reallocation of consump-
tion).
5During the last few years, there have been a number of macro-studies on the
impact of AIDS in South Africa. The ﬁrst ones took a short to medium term per-
spective (Arndt and Lewis, 2000; ING Barings Southern Africa ltd., 2000; BER,
2001). The aim of these studies has been to quantify the eﬀects of AIDS on GDP
growth and other macro-economic indicators. All three studies ﬁnd a negative im-
pact of AIDS on GDP growth as compared to a no AIDS scenario.
The ﬁrst study was conducted by ING Barings Southern Africa ltd. (2000).
Their model can be described as a full, supply-demand econometric model and
includes a large number of behavioral and technological equations. The second study
was carried out by the Bureau of Economic Research at University of Stellenbosch
(BER, 2001). They identiﬁed a number of channels through which AIDS might
have an impact on the South African economy and performed a macro-econometric
simulation exercise to assess the eﬀects of the AIDS epidemic. The third study
(Arndt and Lewis, 2000) used a neoclassical computable general equilibrium model.
Their model can be described as a series of static equilibriums joined together by a
set of updating rules and they found a negative impact of AIDS on GDP per capita.
The other studies found negative growth eﬀects, but not in per capita terms.
All these modeling strategies allow the researcher to include a large degree of
sector and goods heterogeneity. But they are not dynamic in the sense of the decision
of the agents being the result of constrained intertemporal optimization.
The model in this paper is a truly dynamic model with intertemporal optimiza-
tion by households and ﬁrms, as well as by the government. However, I do not
attempt to estimate the long-run growth eﬀects which has been done by Bell et al.
(2003) and Young (2005). In their respective study, they endogenise the impact of
AIDS on human capital and productivity. Interestingly, they arrive at opposite con-
clusions regarding the long-run economic impact of the AIDS epidemic. According
to Young, the positive eﬀect of lower population growth will be enough to counter-
act the negative impact on human capital of AIDS-orphaned children. The basic
mechanism leading to this result is the epidemiologically induced increase in the
6capital-labor ratio.
Bell et. al., on the other hand, are more pessimistic about the economic impact
of AIDS. For South Africa, they conclude that: ”As things now stand, the economy
could be on the brink of a progressive collapse”. In Bell et. al.’s paper, there is
a mechanism for intergenerational accumulation of human capital that is adversely
aﬀected by AIDS. Low expected utility from education will lead to less investment
in education and may eventually lead to a poverty trap with no, or minimum,
investment in education. In Young, education is an optimal consumption decision
by the parents. However, there is not the same kind of accumulation of human
capital over time; hence, AIDS will not have the same long-run detrimental eﬀect as
in Bell et al. In Young’s setting, AIDS will lead to reduced labor supply, increasing
wages and larger income to survivors.
The focus of this paper is rather on the ﬁscal impact of AIDS over the medium
time perspective (i.e. 30 years). In this time frame, AIDS may very well have an
impact on human capital, but it is as yet diﬃcult to say what it will be. There
is some evidence that the eﬀect is not that large after all.4 Therefore, I abstract
from any impact of AIDS on human capital formation. Since the focus is on the
medium-term perspective, it makes more sense to treat the population dynamics as
exogenous to the model and hence, accept the forecasts made by the South African
Actuarial Society’s model under diﬀerent epidemiological assumptions. Given these
forecasts, I look at the ﬁscal and welfare impact of diﬀerent ﬁscal policies assessing
the importance of tax regimes – an optimal Ramsey policy vs. a ﬁxed debt policy.
I also assess the importance of the household credit constraint. Many macro
models of AIDS do assume some sort of credit constraint, for example assuming
that all income is consumed within each period or imposing some exogenously ﬁxed
savings rate. In this paper, I explore the importance of the credit constraint over the
4In South Africa, during the 1990s and the early part of the new century, the school enrolment
rates for the youngest have not declined while for older teenagers they have declined by 5 percent
(from Young (2005), basing his conclusion on information from the October Household Surveys
and population censuses).
7epidemic cycle by comparing a situation with a completely credit constrained house-
hold with that of a household that is free to make any intertemporal reallocation of
consumption.
In this study, I ﬁnd that a welfare optimizing government should reduce the tax
rate during the peak of the epidemic and allow the government debt to increase. The
value (in terms of the household’s willingness to pay) of doing this intertemporal
reallocation is equal to around 10% of GDP in the base year (2000). Furthermore,
I also ﬁnd that a full ARV epidemiological intervention will have a positive ﬁscal
eﬀect that can pay for a large share of the cost of such an intervention. The positive
ﬁscal impact of an intervention is partly due to improvements in dependency ratios
and partly to direct cost savings of fewer people needing health care. The lower
dependency ratio, however, is more important for the government budget than health
care savings.
2 The model
I use the model of a small open economy. It is a dynamic model similar to that of
Flod´ en (2003), although in this version, world factor prices are taken as given and
I do not model the global economy. Capital can move freely but labor is immobile.
The model includes a representative household, a representative ﬁrm and a gov-
ernment. The household chooses consumption and labor supply. The government
chooses a consumption tax, which is used to ﬁnance an exogenously determined
expenditure program. The ﬁrm determines investment and hiring.
2.1 The household











t and ˆ ci
t are consumption per eﬃciency unit per active and inactive household
member in period t, respectively. Disregarding the subindex for the moment, v is
eﬃciency units and h is labor supply per active household member. For any variable
x, ˆ x = x=v. A share ® of the household members is active and n is the size of the
household. The household faces an intertemporal budget constraint
at+1 = at (1 + rt) + ntvt
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where a is household assets, r is the interest rate, w is the wage per eﬃciency unit,
s is transfers, ¿c is the consumption tax and ¿i is the income tax. Assuming a small
open economy means that rt = rW for all t, where rW is the world market interest
rate, assumed to be constant over time. All other variables may change over time.


















The Euler equation is
Uht
®tvt




In the baseline model, I assume that the household faces a total credit constraint
and is not able to borrow or save from one period to the next. The constraint is then
the same as above but with at = 0 for all t and there will not be any Euler-condition
to consider.
92.2 The ﬁrm







where Ht = nt®tvtht. The price of output is normalized to 1 and the proﬁt is
¼t = yt ¡ wtHt ¡ ((1 + ¿¼)rt + ±)kt; (2.7)









wt = (1 ¡ µ)ytH
¡1
t : (2.9)
In the open economy, the interest rate, r, is given and hence, also the wage per
eﬃciency unit, w, will be given.










and then capital, k, and output, y, will simply be a linear function of the amount
of labor, H, used, so that





The government collects taxes on wage income, capital income and consumption (¿i;
¿¼ and ¿c, respectively). It disburses transfers, s, and pays for public consumption,
g: Transfers and public consumption may vary over time but are exogenously deter-
mined. ¿i and ¿¼ are also exogenously determined while ¿c is the government’s only
choice parameter. The government budget constraint is
Dt+1 = Dt (1 + rr) ¡ ¿¼rtkt (2.14)
+nt
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In this paper, I consider two diﬀerent policy objectives: an optimal social policy and
a constant debt policy.
2.3.1 Optimal policy
Optimal tax policy is derived by optimizing the sum of the household’s discounted
utility (i.e. eq. 2.1) s.t. the government’s budget constraint, the household’s budget
constraint and ﬁrst-order condition. I use the primary approach to ﬁnd the Ramsey
allocation,5 that is, I will set up the government’s problem in terms of allocations
and, after having solved for the optimal allocations, the optimal tax rate is derived.
For this purpose, the consumption tax rate needs to be expressed in terms of
allocations. Rewriting 2.3, I get
1 + ¿c;t = ¡
Uˆ ca
t (1 ¡ ¿i)w
Uht
: (2.15)
5See Atkinson and Stiglitz, ch. 12 (1980).
11This expression for the tax rates is then substituted into the budget constraint for
the household to give us the following implementability constraint




















I substitute the household constraints (eq. 2.2) and the expression for k (eq. 2.12)
into the government budget constraint (eq. 2.14) to get
Dt+1 ¡ at+t = (Dt ¡ at)(1 + rt)
+vtnt
£
ˆ gt + ®tˆ c
a
t + (1 ¡ ®t)ˆ c
i
t ¡ ®t (wt + ¿¼rÁ)ht
¤
: (2.17)
The problem for the government is then to maximize household utility (eq. 2.1),
subject to the government and the household budget constraints (eq. 2.17 and 2.16)
and the Euler conditions for the household (eq. 2.5). Once more, we do not have to
consider the Euler condition in the case of a completely credit constrained household.
This is a problem in terms of allocations and exogenously determined parameters
only. When the Ramsey allocation is found, the optimal tax schedule can be obtained
from eq. 2.15. In steady state ˆ ca, ˆ ci, h, ˆ k and ˆ y will be constant while v will grow
at a steady-state growth rate.6
3 Parameterization
The utility function is
6This is suﬃcient to ﬁnd a solution to the Ramsey allocation in the open economy. To ﬁnd
the Ramsey allocation in the closed economy, we would also have to use equations 2.8 and 2.9 to
























Risk aversion, ¾, typically ranges between 1 and 3 in the empirical consumption
literature. Therefore, I set ¾ to 2. Most estimates for the intertemporal labor-supply
elasticity range between 0 and 0.5 for men. However, for women the estimates are
higher and Domeij and Floden 2004 argue that empirical estimates generally have a
downward bias owing to a failure to consider credit constraints. Therefore, I choose
° = 0:7 which will give an intertemporal labor-supply elasticity close to 0.5. The
preference for leisure ³ is typically set so that it will give a labor supply that is
approximately 1/3 of the available time in developed economies with close to full
employment. With the low level of formal employment in South Africa, ³ is set to
give a labor supply that is 1/5 in the ﬁrst period. The chosen form of the utility
function will allow us to include growth in the model. In steady state, we must have
¯(1¡r) = (1+$)¾, where the steady state growth rate $ = 0:005 and interest rate
r = 0:02. Hence, ¯ = 0:99:
I parameterize the model with data mainly from the year 2000. It is assumed
that SA at this date is an economy in transition, implementing a policy with a tight
budget discipline (here formalized as a ﬁxed debt to GDP ratio). Initial govern-
ment debt is R 397 billion (or 41 % of GDP, see parameter D0); that is, the total
loan debt net for the government 2001 (source Department of Finance SA, ”Budget
Review 2003”). Households are assumed to have zero wealth in the initial steady
state. Proﬁles on transfers and public consumption are compiled from data obtained
from Statistics South Africa and Government Ministries and work by van der Berg
(2001a,b). These proﬁles are then adjusted so that aggregate transfers and public
consumption match those found in macro data in the base year.
In the baseline case, I assume that only a small share of those in need of health
13care because of HIV/AIDS will actually receive it. According to the Department of
Health R, 3.6 billion were spent on in- and out-patient hospitalization needs, while
Geﬀen et al. (2003) estimate that the actual need would be R 13.6 billion. Hence,
my assumption is that only a share equal to 3.6/13.6 (or 26%) of AIDS-care need
will be meet over the whole epidemic cycle. When compiling the cost of HIV positive
patients, I use Geﬀen et al.’s cost estimates for diﬀerent stages of the disease.
The income tax and proﬁt tax are set so that the relative tax revenue in the
model corresponds to the relative importance of these taxes in public ﬁnances. The
income tax accounts for 44.24% of the total tax revenues from income, proﬁts and
goods which gives ¿i=0.14. In the model, I will use a capital tax instead of a
proﬁt tax. The share of the proﬁt tax revenue is 14.80% , which gives ¿¼=0.72. The
depreciation rate of capital is set to 0.1.
Population ﬁgures are output from the Actuarial Society of South Africa’s model
ASSA2003 (henceforth the ASSA model).7 The ASSA model forecasts the popu-
lation of SA by population group disaggregated on age and gender. It includes
information on the number of people in various stages of HIV/AIDS under diﬀerent
assumptions on epidemiological interventions. The changing demographic structure
is reﬂected in n, ® and v. The parameters values chosen, based on information from
data or otherwise, are summarized in table 1.
The starting year of the ASSA model is 1985. This is also the starting year of the
AIDS epidemic in the ASSA model. With available empirical information, ASSA
have parameterized the model for it to reproduce the demographic and epidemio-
logical development in South Africa. In my paper, the year 2000 is the base year
and hence, I will use population output from the ASSA model from the year 2000
and onward until 2055. However, in the presentation of the ﬁscal impact in the next
section, I will focus on what happens in the ﬁrst 30 years.
The model includes a number of epidemiological interventions; an information
and education campaign, voluntary counseling and testing and syndromic manage-
7The model was downloaded on January 2, 2006 from http://www.assa.org.za
14Table 1: Parameter values
Risk aversion ¾ 2
Labor supply parameter ° 0:7
Preference for leisure ³ 29¤
Discount factor ¯ 0:99
Interest rate rW 0:02
Steady state growth $ 0:005
Capital’s share of income µ 0:3
Total factor productivity A 3:47¤
Depreciation of capital ± 0:1
Proﬁt tax ¿¼ 0:72
Income tax ¿i 0:14
Households’ initial assets a0 0
Initial Gov. debt/GDP ratio D0 0:42
Share of active ®t ¤¤
Productivity units vt ¤¤
Household size nt ¤¤
Transfers st ¤¤
Government consumption gt ¤¤
Notes:
n0, v0 and y0 are all normalized to one.
* Values determined through calibration.
** For values, see main text and appendix.
15ment of sexually transmitted diseases. These interventions are assumed to have
come a long way towards full implementation when this model starts in 2000 and
by 2004, they have reached their long-run coverage levels. The baseline population
proﬁle of this paper includes these interventions only.
In addition to these interventions, there are also the mother to child transmission
prevention program (MTCTP) and antiretroviral therapy (ARV). These are under
introduction and it is diﬃcult to say to what extent the South African population
will actually get access to these interventions. The years of introduction of these
interventions in the ASSA model are 2000 for ARV and 2001 for MTCTP. In section
4.2, I will explore the ﬁscal implications of introducing these additional interventions.
I will investigate the ﬁscal implications of the following three scenarios: ﬁrst,
the above-described scenario with baseline interventions, henceforth referred to as
the baseline scenario; second, a scenario including the baseline intervention plus
the MTCTP intervention, henceforth referred to as the MTCTP scenario and; ﬁ-
nally, a scenario including all interventions in the MTCTP scenario plus the ARV
intervention, to which I will refer as the ARV or full intervention scenario.
It is assumed that 45% of the AIDS sick will not be able to work.8 25% of those
receiving ART (or having discontinued an ART treatment) are assumed to be AIDS
sick.9
4 Results
In the following, I will use the model presented in section 2 to explore ﬁscal eﬀects
of diﬀerent policy options in terms of epidemiological interventions (section 4.2).
Next, I look at the importance of taxation policy and also explore to what extent
this result depends on assumptions about the household’s credit constraint (section
4.3). In section 4.4, the implications of the openness of the economy are explored.
8This is in line with the assumptions made by Arndt and Lewis (2000) and BER (2001), as-
suming a 50 and 40 percent productivity reduction, respectively.
9See appendix B for more details on parameterization.
16Note that, in the estimations that follow, I have not included any cost for dif-
ferent epidemiological interventions. The cost for ARV has been falling and it is
diﬃcult to know what the future cost will be. Hence, what I will calculate is the ﬁs-
cal impact net of the cost for interventions, which will indicate how many resources
the interventions will liberate, which could be used to partially ﬁnance these inter-
ventions. In section 5, I will provide some ”back of the envelope” calculation on the
scope for self-ﬁnancing of an ARV intervention. Let me ﬁrst outline a baseline case
that will be used as a point of reference, however.
4.1 Baseline case
In the baseline case, I assume the household to be completely credit constrained.
It may seem like a strong assumption and it is true that many households can
borrow when hit by AIDS and the economic stress it implies. However, for many
poor households, there is a real limit to how much they can borrow to ﬁnance
consumption. It is often friends and relatives who provide the means to get by. But
when whole communities are struck by the epidemic, there is a also a limit to this
option, since your friends and relatives will be in as much need of support as you are.
Therefore, the assumption of a totally credit constrained household is appropriate
in the context, although I explore the implications of relaxing this assumption in
section 4.3.
However, even if the absolute credit constraint assumption somewhat exagger-
ates the budgetary restrictions facing the household, the representative household
assumption works in the other direction. It implies complete risk sharing between
all cohorts. When AIDS hits one cohort, all cohorts will help bear the burden by
cutting back on consumption.
The government’s goal in the baseline case is to balance the budget by means of
a debt target – that is, keeping the debt to GDP rate constant. This constitutes a
formalization of the fairly tight ﬁscal policy of the South African government.
17Hence, we are not looking at the Ramsey allocation in the baseline case. However,
in section 4.3, I will compare the baseline allocation with the Ramsey allocation and
also try to estimate the welfare eﬀect of an optimal policy, instead of the suboptimal
policy of debt targeting (henceforth, I will refer to the taxation policy resulting in
the Ramsey allocation as the optimal policy).
Let us now look at what this debt targeting policy implies for taxation over the
epidemic cycle. The driving force behind what is happening will be the changing
dependency ratio. The dependency ratio is here deﬁned as the population aged
0-15 and above 65, plus those of working age (aged 16-65) that are ill with AIDS in
relation to the remaining working age population. In ﬁgure 3, we see the dependency
ratio in the top graph and below is the consumption tax rate necessary to give a
constant debt/GDP ratio.
From the bottom part of ﬁgure 3, we see that the necessary increase in the tax
is rather distinct over the peak of the epidemic. The reason for this increase is
twofold. First, as more and more people become AIDS sick, there will be more
health care expenditures for various opportunistic diseases. Second, the whole age
structure changes when people die from AIDS. Relatively more people become net
beneﬁciaries from the public system in relation to prime age taxpayers.
After the peak of the epidemic, the dependency ratio will once more start to fall
more rapidly and the government can then lower the tax rate and still keep a ﬁxed
debt level. Now, household consumption will also increase (note how consumption
catches up after 2012 when the epidemic has peaked, see ﬁgure 410).
In addition to the AIDS epidemic, there is also an ongoing demographic transi-
tion in SA due to falling birth rates. The AIDS epidemic will cause the dependency
ratio to fall at a slower pace at the beginning of the 21st century.11 In the baseline
scenario, the share of AIDS sick in the population increases up to its peak in 2012.12
10In the ﬁgure, consumption is in terms of per eﬃciency units.
11For comparison, the falling dependency ratio in the absence of AIDS is plotted in the top
graph of ﬁgure 16 in the appendix, along with the dependency ratio of the AIDS-inclusive baseline
scenario.
12See ﬁgure 16 in the appendix.
18Figure 3: Dependency ratios and tax rates



































The basic pattern of the dependency ratio in ﬁgure 3 is the same, regardless of which
epidemiological intervention option the government chooses (see ﬁgure 5). But, as
we will see below, interventions will still have a signiﬁcant impact.
19Figure 4: Allocations
































4.2 The ﬁscal impact of epidemiological interventions
In the baseline case, the government does not implement any mother to child trans-
mission prevention (MTCTP) or antiretroviral therapy (ARV). Now, I will allow for
the MTCTP and ARV interventions.
We see the dependency ratios for the three diﬀerent scenarios in ﬁgure 5. The
diﬀerences in dependency ratios are visible four to ﬁve years after the interventions
have been initiated. An introduction of a full intervention programme including ARV
results in lower dependency ratios than in the baseline scenario, due to the reduction
in morbidity and death rates among the active population. Only adding an MTCTP
intervention without giving people access to ARV will cause the dependency ratio
to increase since more children per mother will survive, while there is no reduction
in morbidity and death among the active.
Let us assume that the government wants to keep a ﬁxed debt to GDP ratio
20Figure 5: Intervention and dependency ratios




























Notes: Based on forecast from the Actuarial Society of South Africa’s demographic model.The
dependency ratio is deﬁned as young, old and AIDS-sick in relation to the non-AIDS-sick
working age population (i.e. 16-65 year of age).
regardless of which intervention policy it pursues. It would then have to use diﬀer-
ent tax schedules depending on how the population proﬁle changes in the diﬀerent
scenarios. Figure 6 plots tax schedules that would keep the debt ratio constant for
the three diﬀerent interventions. Looking at the year 2015, for example, the tax
rate would have to be 1.11 percentage points higher in the no intervention scenario
as compared to the full ARV intervention scenario to keep the debt rate constant.
This is one way of comparing the ﬁscal impact of interventions. Another way is
to apply the same tax schedule in all scenarios and instead look at the development
of the government debt. This is maybe more interesting, since we can then get an
idea of the size of the ﬁscal beneﬁt of interventions.
Let us use the tax schedule that would give a constant debt to GDP ratio in the
baseline scenario and apply it to both the MTCTP- and ARV-scenarios. Figure 7
21Figure 6: Intervention and taxes































shows the resulting development of government debt in the diﬀerent cases.
Remember, no cost for the intervention is included in these calculations. Hence,
what we are looking at here is the eﬀect on the government budget that comes
from the eﬀect of a changing age proﬁle (dependency ratio) of the population, plus
the eﬀect of a change in the number of HIV positive people and people with AIDS
needing health care.
I can then evaluate the ﬁscal eﬀect of such an intervention by asking how much
additional government debt the government could accept in the ﬁrst period of the
intervention and still be at the same debt to GDP ratio as without the intervention
(i.e. given that I keep the same tax rates and spending policies as in the non-
intervention case). With full intervention, I can impose an additional debt burden
on the government of 10.0% of GDP in the ﬁrst period and the debt/GDP ratio
would still be the same as in the non-intervention case year 2030. This is, in ﬁscal
22Figure 7: Intervention and government debt





























terms, the present value of the intervention, that is how much the government could
spend on the intervention until 2030 without losing a Rand. To this extent, the
intervention pays for itself (from a narrow ﬁscal point of view) through the positive
demographic eﬀect and health care cost savings. 13;14
13If I instead implement all interventions except the ARV intervention, I would then have to
make a positive transfer to the government of 1.0% of GDP, for it not to have a higher debt/GDP
ratio in the year 2030. That is, only adding an MTCTP intervention without providing any ARV
will give a minor negative ﬁscal impact.
14Adding up the ﬁscal eﬀects over the period 2000 to 2030 only is a somewhat arbitrary choice.
The reason for concentrating on this period is the uncertainty of the demographic development,
the further we look into the future. The architects behind ASSA2003 strongly advised against
using the model for any further forecast of the population than 25 to 30 years into the future. I
do, however, use the ASSA2003 model for a longer forecast used as input in the economic model
(see section 3) but when adding up the ﬁscal eﬀects in this section, I limit the calculation to the
period for which the population could be forecasted with some degree of certainty. If I were to
choose to ad up the ﬁscal impact over a shorter period, say 2000 to 2025, the ﬁscal value of a full
ARV intervention (i.e. what the government could spend in present value terms of the interventions
during that period and without any eﬀect on government debt) would equal 8.3% of GDP in the
ﬁrst period. If I were instead to extend the period to 2035, the ﬁscal value would equal 11.7% of
GDP.
23The ﬁscal value of the ARV intervention is partly due to the health care cost
saving eﬀect of less AIDS related illnesses and partly to the eﬀect of the changing
demographic structure on the remaining ﬁscal ﬂows. The ﬁrst eﬀect accounts for
1.4%-points of the total eﬀect and the latter eﬀect accounts for the remaining 8.6%-
points.
Recall that these estimates are based on the assumption that the current ra-
tioning (i.e. 26% inclusion) of AIDS patients in health care will be constant over the
whole evaluated period. With a larger coverage, the potential ﬁscal beneﬁt of ARV
will of course increase. Let us, for example, assume that 60% of all AIDS patients
needing care will get it (though, as before, I am not including treatment). Then,
the ﬁscal beneﬁt of an ARV intervention will increase to 12.7% in terms of GDP in
the ﬁrst period.15;16
The indirect ﬁscal impact through the demographic structure is rather more
important than the direct health care cost saving eﬀect. Still, the direct cost saving
eﬀect in the health sector is substantial, the more so the less patient rationing there
is.17
4.3 Tax policies
Tax policies determine which cohorts will carry the burden of the epidemic. In the
baseline case, the assumption is that the government wants to keep the debt to GDP
ratio constant. Alternatively, I could assume that the government wishes to spread
taxation over time in a way that would maximize the discounted sum of household
welfare rather than keeping the debt rate constant. Given that the government only
implements the baseline intervention, I get the alternative tax schedule shown in
ﬁgure 8 and the resulting allocations in ﬁgure 9 for the ﬁxed debt and optimal tax
15Now, the health care cost saving eﬀect accounts for 5.2% and the demographic eﬀect for 7.6%.
16The calculations are made in the same way as in the previous example. That is, I ﬁnd the tax
schedule that will give a constant debt in the non-intervention case and then also apply this in the
full ARV-intervention case. Thereafter, I evaluate the present value diﬀerence in the government
debt year 2030.
17This is also demonstrated by the calculation by Geﬀen et al. (2003).
24policy, respectively.18 The higher tax for the ﬁxed debt policy has a direct impact
on the household in the form of lower consumption. However, the supply of labor is
only marginally aﬀected by the choice of policy.
Figure 8: Tax policies and tax rates




























From a welfare point of view, it would be optimal to keep taxation relatively low
when the dependency ratio is high. This implies that government debt will build
up under this period and future generations will help carry the burden of AIDS
through debt servicing. In ﬁgure 10, we see how government debt develops under
the optimal taxation policy and under the ﬁxed debt/GDP-ratio policy which, by
deﬁnition, is a straight line.
How can we translate the welfare eﬀect of diﬀerent taxation policies into some
ﬁscal measure? This can be done by calculating how much we would have to com-
18Consumption in ﬁgure 9 is the weighted sum of the active and inactive household members’
consumption.
25Figure 9: Tax policies and allocations



















































pensate the government under a suboptimal tax schedule to neutralize the welfare
eﬀect. To be more precise, let us consider the following two policy packages.
First, we have the ﬁxed debt to GDP policy. The second package is the optimal
taxation policy described above with the supplement of an additional initial debt
imposed on the government. For the two packages to give the same discounted
utility, the initial additional debt under the optimal policy would have to be 0.12
times GDP. This is a present value measure of what the household would indirectly
(i.e. through future tax payments) be willing to give up to get the optimal policy.
Important factors for determining the size of this eﬀect are the changing dependency
ratio through the epidemic, the household’s intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(1/¾) and labor supply elasticity.
If I were to lower ¾ from 2 to 1.5, then the corresponding additional debt burden
26Figure 10: Debt under diﬀerent tax policies

























would be 0.08 times GDP. 19 As would be expected, the welfare eﬀect of choosing an
optimal policy is no longer as high. If I were instead to increase ° from 0.7 to 1, the
additional debt burden would have to be 0.11 times GDP for the household to be
indiﬀerent between the two policies.20 However, the general result still remains – the
choice of tax policy is indeed important. The conclusion is that in an economy which
goes through demographic changes and where the households are credit constrained,
there will be signiﬁcant welfare eﬀects if the government cannot postpone some of
the cost for the epidemic and take advantage of the long-run falling dependency
ratios.
Let us return to the baseline value of ¾ = 2 and ° = 0:7 and assume that the
government chooses to implement a full ARV intervention program. In this case,
19With an increase in ¾ to 2.5, the additional debt would have to be 0.15 times GDP.
20The baseline parameterization of ° = 0:7 results in a Frisch labor supply elasticity of approxi-
mately 0.48 and with ° = 1 the same elasticity is 0.61.
27the corresponding additional debt burden under optimal policy would have to be
0.08 for welfare to be the same as under a ﬁxed debt rate policy. That is, under
full ARV intervention, the choice of tax regime will have less impact on household
welfare than under the baseline intervention.
Critical for these results is the assumption made about the household credit con-
straint. In the baseline case, household revenues must equal household expenditures
within each period. Now, I loosen this assumption and instead impose a lifetime
budget constraint. Within each period, revenues and expenditures no longer need
to match.
Ceteris paribus the household will supply less labor and consume more under the
peak of the epidemic without than with the credit constraint. Hence, it will build up
a debt that future cohorts of the household will service. The assumption made about
the household’s credit constraint is, indeed, very important for the result. Without
any household credit constraint, the argument for government intervention (with
possible support of international donors) is not as strong. As would be expected,
the choice of taxation policy will not be as critical to household welfare when it is free
to borrow. The household would now be prepared to accept only 0.002 times GDP in
additional initial government debt for an optimal taxation schedule, as compared to
a ﬁxed debt rate policy.21 Recall from the previous section that when the household
cannot borrow, it is willing to accept 0.12 times GDP in initial government debt to
have the optimal tax schedule.
If the government or the household is free to borrow and optimize under an
intertemporal budget constraint, this will lead to an increase the net foreign debt
of the countries. In ﬁgure 11, we see the development of aggregate domestic assets
in the two cases.22 Although the development of domestic assets will be similar in
21This ﬁgure is derived in the same way as when diﬀerent tax policies were compared in section
4.3. That is, I subject the household to two diﬀerent policy packages: package one is a ﬁxed debt
policy and package two is the optimal (Ramsey) tax policy plus an initial additional government
debt. The size of the debt is determined so that the household will be indiﬀerent between the two
policy packages. The additional debt is then a ﬁscal measure of the household’s valuation of the
optimal policy.
22The initial aggregated domestic assets will be negative and equal to the government’s assets
28the two cases, the ﬁnal steady state domestic debt is less in the model with a credit
constrained household and an optimal tax policy.
As already discussed, it is reasonable to assume that the household is credit con-
strained. However, also the government faces constraints and it may have a good
reason to pursue a tight ﬁscal discipline. It can be very hard to arrive at, and
maintain, ﬁscal discipline. Once the government starts to allow itself to run budget
deﬁcits and ﬁnance expenditures, it might be hard to return to a balanced budget.
With a large debt, the government also exposes itself to larger risk. The margins are
thinner in case of unforeseen economic shocks and, at some point, the credit rating
of the country will fall and the cost of borrowing will increase – neither of which is
included in the this model. An alternative would be for the donors to provided gen-
eral budget support for current expenditures over the peak of the epidemic. Then,
the government can maintain service and grant levels without having to increase
taxes and/or government debt. Let us say that the donors would like to contribute
an amount equal to what the households would be willing to sacriﬁce to obtain a
better intertemporal allocation. The donors should then contribute budget support
equal to approximately 10%23 of GDP in the year 2000, spread over the peak of the
epidemic.
(recall that the government starts with a debt, D0 = 0:42, and that the household begins with
zero assets, a0 = 0).
23Between 0.08 and 0.12 according to the above analysis, depending on to what degree the ARV
intervention is rolled out and the resulting impact on the dependency ratio.
29Figure 11: Aggregate domestic assets






















Optimal tax, with credit constr.
Fix debt, no credit constr.
4.4 Open vs. closed economy
The assumption of a small open economy is critical for the above analysis. The
implication is that factor prices are determined by the world market and will not
change, regardless of what happens to productivity, demography, etc. There is no
direct link between domestic investment and savings.
To close the economy, I will have to make an alteration to the model, since it
contains no domestic capital owner. By deﬁnition, all capital must be domestically
owned in a closed economy. Therefore, I introduce a second household in the model








ak;t+1 = ak;t(1 + rt) + vtˆ c
k
t; (4.2)
where ˆ ck is the capitalist’s consumption per eﬃciency unit and ak is her assets. In
the steady state, ˆ ck is constant.24 Furthermore, the domestic capital market must
clear in each period
at + ak;t ¡ Dt = kt: (4.3)
That is, the households’ and the government’s aggregated savings must equal capital.
The initial asset of the capital owner is equal to the net foreign asset in the ﬁrst
period in the baseline case above; else, the assumptions are the same as in the
baseline case.25
There will be no dramatic diﬀerence in allocations in an open as compared to a
closed economy. During transition, capital and consumption will be somewhat less
in the closed economy (see ﬁgure 12).26 The interest rate will be higher and wages
lower in the closed economy (see ﬁgure 13).
Most closed economy papers predict that the capital/labor ratio increases as
AIDS takes its toll. This will reduce the return to capital and increase the return
to labor. However, this does not happen in the open economy, since capital will
go abroad, thus adjusting the capital labor balance when the workforce is reduced.
(Haacker, 2002)
Let us compare a closed economy with baseline intervention with a closed econ-
omy with full ARV intervention, to see whether the result will be the expected, that
is a higher capital labor ratio in the baseline scenario. The baseline intervention
(i.e. a situation with high AIDS rates) will indeed give a higher capital-labor ratio
as shown by ﬁgure 14. The ratio of the interest rate to that of the wage becomes a
24The functional form of the utility function is the same as for the inactive part of the working
household, that is U(vtˆ ck





25That is, the working household is credit constrained and the government pursues a ﬁxed debt
policy and the baseline AIDS intervention policy.
26Consumption is the weighted sum of consumption of the active and inactive. The curves show
consumption and capital per eﬃciency unit.
31mirror image of the capital-labor ratio. With a relatively high capital-labor ratio,
the interest rate will be relatively low. In the open economy, the capital-labor ratio,
as well as relative factor income, will be constant, regardless of AIDS prevalence
rates.27 28
Figure 12: Allocations







































27The capital-labor labor ratio in ﬁgure 14 is deﬁned as kt=Ht. Note that, from equation 2.12
we have that the capital-labor ratio in the open economy is equal to Á.
28In the ﬁnal steady state, the capital-labor ratio will be the same in the closed economy as
in the open, regardless of which dependency ratio we have. This is at odds with Haacker (2002)
and others. Why is that? The household’s saving decision is endogenous in my model. The rate
at which households discount future utility will determine the steady state interest rate. With a
given household discount rate, there can only be one given steady state interest rate. The reason
why we ﬁnd other results, in for example Haacker, is that the saving decision is not endogenized
in a general equilibrium framework.
32Figure 13: Tax rate and prices










































33Figure 14: Comparing baseline intervention with full intervention in a closed
economy























































The main contributions of this paper are to point at the ﬁscal beneﬁt of a full
epidemiological intervention and the welfare impact of diﬀerent tax regimes over
the period 2000 to 2030 in South Africa. If households are assumed to be credit
constrained, intertemporal ﬁnancing of government expenditures is important. The
households would be willing to accept an additional R 104 billion (or 12% of GDP) in
government debt, if the government were to choose a welfare optimizing tax schedule
as compared to applying a ﬁxed debt to GDP policy in the baseline scenario. If the
government chooses to implement a full ARV intervention program, the choice of
tax regime is somewhat less important. The tax regime will not be important for
the household if it can freely borrow and lend to smooth its consumption.
The ﬁscal value of a full intervention program over the period 2000-2030, as
compared to the baseline intervention, would be equivalent to 10.0% of GDP in
the year 2000 or R 89 billion. This is when I assume that the government only
covers 26% of the committed treatment cost of opportunistic diseases. I also showed
that for an ARV intervention, the demographic impact on the ﬁscal ﬂows of taxes,
transfers and government consumption is more important than the direct health
care cost savings.
How does the positive ﬁscal eﬀect of an ARV intervention compare to the cost
of the intervention – does it have any signiﬁcance? The answer is yes. In Geﬀen
and Nattrass (2004), the average annual cost of ARV treatment is estimated to be
R 3.0 billion for the period 2002 to 2015 under the full intervention scenario of the
ASSA model. That makes an annual cost per person treated of R 4 838 in year 2000
prices. If we take this estimate and multiply by the number of people receiving ARV
between 2000 and 2030, assuming that the cost would be the same over the whole
period, we will get a total present value cost of R 94 billion.29 That is, the positive
29The number of persons receiving ARV medicines each year is given by ﬁgure 15. The total
number of person-years of ARV treatments between 2000 and 2030 is 29 million. These numbers
are based on the demographic model developed by the Actuarial Society of South Africa.
35Figure 15: People receiving ARV medicines





























ﬁscal eﬀect of a full ARV intervention would to a large extent pay for the cost of
such an intervention.30
Here, I have only compared the positive ﬁscal impact with the cost of an ARV
intervention. A full intervention against HIV/AIDS includes more elements such as
mother to child transmission prevention, treatment of sexually transmitted diseases,
information campaigns and counseling. The cost for these additional interventions
is, however, minor as compared to the cost of antiretroviral drugs. How interventions
are ﬁnanced in the end will, of course, be of signiﬁcance to the SA economy. Large
external funds into one activity, such as an HIV/AIDS intervention, may cause Dutch
30The extent to which an ARV intervention is self-ﬁnancing is sensitive to the assumption about
productivity growth in the model. With a larger productivity growth or a further drop in prices
for ARV drugs, the intervention could be more than self-ﬁnancing. Note that the estimates in this
paper are based on a rather modest assumption of a 0.5% annual real growth rate. Furthermore,
if the government were to cover a larger share of the care cost for opportunistic diseases of HIV+
patients than the 26% assumed in this paper, the ﬁscal beneﬁt of an ARV would, of course, increase.
36disease eﬀects with an impact on other sectors of the economy. If the interventions
are ﬁnanced by current or future taxing of labor, capital or proﬁts or by reducing
investment in essential infrastructure, education etc., this will have an impact on
productivity. Including a negative eﬀect on factor productivity of the ﬁnancing
of intervention will lead to a less positive ﬁscal impact of interventions than that
calculated in this paper. There are also constraints to intertemporally reallocating
the ﬁnancing of public expenditures by loans. Higher government debt will make
the government more vulnerable to unforeseen economic shocks and will probably
make borrowing more expensive. These are all additional aspects that policy makers
will have to consider, but which are not explicitly dealt with in this paper.
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39A More on parameterization
A.1 The demographic proﬁles
The demographic proﬁles of this paper are based on the demographic model de-
veloped by the Actuarial Society of South Africa (ASSA). The population in their
model is disaggregated on basis of sex, age, population group and risk group with
diﬀerent assumptions on fertility and mortality for infected and non-infected per-
sons. The risk groups range from a group of people at no risk at all of becoming
infected to people with a sexual activity similar to that of commercial sex workers.
Within each risk group, the modelers have made assumptions about sexual activity,
contacts with individuals from diﬀerent risk groups, condom use and probabilities
of becoming infected when involved in unprotected sex. There are also speciﬁc
assumptions about mother to child transmission of HIV.
A mortality rate of 30% per annum is assumed for children born with the virus
and a median time to death of six years for those who contract the disease via
mothers’ milk. Otherwise, the model assumes a median time to death of 11 years for
those under 25 and 10 years for those that are 25 years or older when infected. The
model has been calibrated to give as good a ﬁt as possible with existing information
on population and prevalence rates. For more details on the model, see the user
guide ”ASSA AIDS and demographic models” (ASSA, 2005).
In the model, as people get ARV treatment, it is assumed that this will lead to
a 75% reduction in morbidity rate among both adults and children. That is, ARV
does not mean that an HIV positive person will not get AIDS, it just means that
this is likely to happen later rather than earlier.
From the demographic model, we can obtain diﬀerent data. For example, ﬁgure
16 plots the dependency ratio and the share of AIDS sick in the population. In
the top graph, I have plotted the dependency ratio both for a no-AIDS scenario
and for an AIDS-inclusive scenario (with the baseline epidemiological intervention).
40Although, the AIDS epidemic, in the model, has been going on since the year 1985,
it is only after the year 2000 that it starts to have a signiﬁcant impact on the
dependency ratio.
From the ASSA model, I ﬁrst extracted a population parameter nt;i;j which is
population in year t =2000, 2001,.., at age i =0, 1,.. ..90 and with HIV/AIDS status
j =1 (HIV-negative), 2 (HIV-positive ﬁrst and second stage), 3 (HIV-positive, third








Figure 16: AIDS sick and the dependency ratio








































41A.2 Active population and productivity proﬁle
To calculate the productivity proﬁle for the household, I use Statistics South Africa’s
Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) for the year 2000. I take the mean income
and divide it by the mean of the time at work. I use three-year moving averages to
smoothen this ﬁgure. The income variable is made up of the sum of the variables
P2401Q0101, P2401Q0102, P2401Q0103, P2401Q0104 and P2401Q02. The working
time variable is made up of ”worked”, where I changed all values ”worked”=2 to
”worked”=0, and then took the mean. This mean is then the share of respondents
that said they had been doing any work during the last seven days. This is a very
imprecise measure of the extent to which people work. Both household income and
employment are believed to be underestimated in the 2000 census Statistics South
Africa (2004). Mean income is shown in the upper plot of ﬁgure 17. Labor supply
is in the next plot and the resulting productivity proﬁle, Vi, for i =16,17,.. ...65 is
in the bottom graph.
To get the measure for productivity used in the model, vt, I take the weighted
sum for the productivity of each active age group. The weights are each age group’s










j=1 nt;i;j + 0:75nt;i;5 + 0:55(nt;i;4 + 0:25nt;i;5)
i:
Productivity proﬁles are assumed to be constant over time, but the productivity
measure will still change between periods because the relative share of diﬀerent
active age-groups changes.
The share of active, ®, in the household is the share of people aged 16-65 (less
45% of the AIDS sick) to that of the total population. Because of the changing

































































Notes: Based on the IES 2000.
A.3 Social transfer proﬁle
The parameter for transfers to the two households was calculated in the follow-
ing way. From the IES 2000, I added up the variables for Social pensions or al-
lowances (P2401Q070301), Disability grants (P2401Q070302), Family and other al-
lowances (P2401Q070303) and the workmen’s compensation (P2401Q0704). For
these summed social transfers, I take the mean for each age group between 0 to
90 years of age and then multiply this proﬁle on transfers to the household with
the ASSA2000 population proﬁle for the year 2000. If all ﬁgures gave an accurate
picture of the social transfers in the year 2000, they would match macro data on
transfers to household in that same year.
However, the macro data SA Reserve Bank (2002) gives a ﬁgure that is 49%
higher than what is obtained from combining IES data with output from ASSA2000.
43There might be ﬂaws in the macro data, the micro data of the IES and data from
the population model. It is generally considered that there are problems with un-
derreporting on beneﬁts in the IES 2000, but it is outside the scope of this study to
proceed further into these issues. What I do is that I accept the aggregated ﬁgure
on transfers and then adjust the level of the transfer proﬁle obtained from the IES
so that the micro data matches the macro data when applying the demographic
proﬁle from ASSA. The proﬁle for social transfers, Si, obtained from IES, is plotted









Figure 18: Social transfers



















Notes: Based on the IES 2000.
44A.4 Government consumption proﬁle
Educational expenditures have been distributed over ages 7-26. Apart from ed-
ucation, health expenditures are also to a large extent age dependent. Old and
young people generally consume more health care services than (HIV-negative) peo-
ple in their middle age. Unfortunately, I lack information to disaggregate health
expenditures and other government consumption with respect to age. Hence, these
expenditures have been split equally over the age categories. The resulting rough
government consumption proﬁle, Gi, in ﬁgure 19 was created on the basis of informa-
tion from van der Berg (2001a,b), Statistics South Africa on spending on education
and other government consumption and ﬁgures from the Human Development Re-
port UNDP (2001) on enrollment rates.
Figure 19: Government consumption proﬁles







































Notes: Based information from Statistics South Africa and other sources (see, the text).
This proﬁle does not include the cost for treating HIV+ people for opportunistic
45Table 2: Health care cost of AIDS
Stage Cost per patient per year
Adult stage one R 1 378
Adult stage two R 1 378
Adult stage three R 6 572
Adult with AIDS R 18 020
Adult on HAART who has become healthy again R 1 378
Child pre-AIDS R 1378
Child with AIDS R18 020
Notes: Source, Geﬀen et al. (2003)
diseases. For each year, I add these expenditures using the cost estimates from
Geﬀen et al. (2003). These are given in table 2.
There are two sources for the change of government expenditures over time. First,
government expenditures will change because of the changing size and age proﬁle of
the general population. Second, the change in the number of HIV positive people















where ! is the coverage of health care cost for AIDS sick people (though, not in-
cluding ARV treatment). In the baseline case, ! is equal to 0.26 but there are also
some estimates in the paper with less rationing (! = 0:6).
46